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4Germany is entering a new legislative period with a strong 
economic position. Across the board, current figures and  
forecasts for the near future are encouraging. But both the 
private sector and society are confronted with major chal-
lenges – globalization, digitalization and demographic 
shifts are transforming the demands made on our economy. 
Current economic policy in Germany must pave the way for 
tomorrow’s prosperity. This involves making a priority out 
of promoting growth that provides everyone an opportunity  
to participate in and thereby benefit from this growth. We 
need an Agenda for Inclusive Growth.
Inclusive Growth for Germany –  
Ten recommendations for increasing growth 
and inclusion in Germany
Goals Recommendations 
1.  Improve location quality and protect public capital 
stock
  1.  Maintain traditional infrastructures, expand digital  
 infrastructure
  2.  Increase public investment and build capacities
2.  Increase labor-market participation   3.  Expand childcare, improve education
  4.  Reform tax-and-transfer systems
3.  Foster wealth creation   5.  Wealth policies should target lower-income households 
  6.  Expand access to productive capital
4.  Foster entrepreneurial activity   7.  Expand startup financing opportunities
  8.  Leverage migrant entrepreneur potential
5. Promote innovation   9.  Promote inclusion through innovation 
 10.  Strengthen innovation
Five goals and ten recommendations for inclusive growth in Germany:
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Goal 1:  
Improve location quality and protect public capital 
stock
Recommendation 1:  
Maintain traditional infrastructures, expand digital 
infrastructure
Despite its economic standing, Germany lags behind in 
terms of public investment. Between 2005 and 2014, the 
government slated an average of 2.2 percent of its GDP for 
the development of roads, schools and preschools. In the 
same period, OECD countries directed on average 3.3 per-
cent of their GDP toward investments. Germany’s infra-
structure is eroding as its public capital stock diminishes. 
The federal government and states must reach an agree-
ment on an investment package for the new legislative pe-
riod. This package must include investment targeting the 
maintenance and expansion of traditional infrastructures 
as well as the expansion of a glass cable network through-
out the country in order to ensure a digital infrastructure 
that is fit for the future. This package would involve the 
state spending an additional € 5 billion annually. Findings 
show that an investment of this nature would have positive 
effects on growth and employment. 
Recommendation 2: 
Increase public investment and build capacities
Closing the investment gaps in key areas such as education 
and infrastructure require long-term planning. The fact 
that currently available funds are not flowing into these ar-
eas should not lead to the fallacious decision to not invest 
in the future. We must instead (re)build education and in-
frastructure capacities and improve the efficiency of ad-
ministrative structures. Germany’s debt rule is a sound in-
strument for reducing excessive debt in public budgets. 
However, at the same time, it should not prevent govern-
ment from making necessary investments in the future. In 
order to maintain public capital stock, both the federal and 
state governments must protect and increase public in-
vestment and thereby ensure net investment remains in 
the black. 
Goal 2:  
Increase labor-market participation 
Recommendation 3: 
Expand childcare, improve education
Now, more than ever, is the time to invest in education.  
Expanding childcare would also enable more women to 
participate more fully in the labor market. A high-quality 
education system would help create the key factors needed 
for social mobility. For the new legislative period, the fed-
eral government and states must reach an agreement on 
expanding full-day schools and the introduction of an op-
timal staff size for daycare facilities. Achieving these aims 
requires an annual € 10.4 billion investment. The impact 
would be significant: Educational attainment and voca-
tional opportunities among youth would improve. More 
women would be in employment, which would help reduce 
income gaps. In the medium term, such investment would 
lead to higher GDP growth and a significant reduction in 
public debt levels.
Recommendation 4: 
Reform tax-and-transfer systems
Germany’s tax-and-transfer systems are not aligned in 
such a way as to incentivize earning additional income. 
Low-income earners retain less of each additional euro 
earned than do higher income earners. In some cases, 
earning extra income among low-income earners can actu-
ally involve a net loss in household income. Policymakers 
must address the need to reform Germany’s tax-and-
transfer system in this legislative period. The systems 
should be harmonized to ensure that additional work al-
ways yields payoffs. One option would be to integrate the 
child benefit, housing allowance and unemployment bene-
fit II (Hartz reforms) into a coordinated transfer benefit 
with a constant transfer withdrawal rate of 60 percent.
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Foster wealth creation
Recommendation 5: 
Wealth policies should target lower-income households
In cross-national comparison, Germany stands out for 
featuring a relatively average level of wealth and consid-
erable inequality in the distribution of wealth. Some  
40 percent of the population has no appreciable wealth –  
a situation that can be attributed in large part to a rudder-
less wealth policy. And the challenges are growing: the 
unequal distribution of wealth only exacerbates growing 
gaps in income. Wealth policy must be made a visible and 
tangible priority in the new legislative period. The key 
features of wealth policy reform must include the bun-
dling of resources (which are currently distributed in 
ways confusing to most), an increase in the use of funds 
for palpable effect, and measures targeting low-income 
households.
Recommendation 6: 
Expand access to productive capital
To date, Germany’s wealth policy has failed to ensure that 
all citizens have access to creating wealth. This has to do 
with the fact that government support has focused on re-
tirement arrangements that yield little for those who save 
and waste considerable amounts on administration. In ad-
dition, despite the structural changes underway in the 
world of work, pension payment schemes and contracts are 
often linked to full-time employment. Increasingly, more 
people are and will fall through the cracks in such a system, 
which further fuels inequality in the distribution of wealth. 
Everyone in society must have the opportunity to benefit 
from the productive capital of a society. This involves the 
state underwriting investment opportunities that are flex-
ible, transparent, cost-effective and easily understood.  
In line with the changing conditions in the labor market, 
these investment opportunities should not be linked di-
rectly to employment. Wealth policy should not be limited 
to a narrow focus on pension schemes. People must be  
allowed to determine themselves what they do with their 
assets and when to take action.
Goal 4:  
Foster entrepreneurial activity
Recommendation 7: 
Expand startup financing opportunities
The strength of Germany’s social market economy relies 
heavily on the health of small and medium-sized enter-
prises. SMEs generate more than 50 percent of net added 
value in the German economy and play a key role in voca-
tional training and employment. They are the drivers of 
key innovation efforts. However, increasingly fewer people 
in Germany are willing to take the risk of starting a busi-
ness or taking over a company as a successor. German 
policymakers cannot accept the ongoing decline in busi-
ness founders and successors. We need a change in Ger-
many’s entrepreneurial climate. Specifically, this in-
volves increasing funds for startup financing. Entrepre-
neurs in innovative sectors in particular must have 
greater access to venture capital. Policymakers at the  
federal and state levels must work together with local 
chambers of commerce and development banks in imple-
menting transparent, easily accessible programs.
Recommendation 8: 
Leverage migrant entrepreneur potential
Increasingly more people with an immigrant background 
are starting businesses in Germany. They breathe new life 
into the German economy, create jobs and help clear paths 
of integration for themselves and others. In 2014, more 
than 2 million people were employed thanks to the entre-
preneurial activity of migrants in Germany. Advisory offer-
ings that target this group in particular can help ensure 
the long-term success of startups. The input of decision 
makers at the federal state level and chambers of com-
merce alike is needed here. In addition, we must do more 
to remove the institutional barriers faced by entrepreneurs 
with a migrant background. 
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Promote innovation
Recommendation 9: 
Promote inclusion through innovation
In the German economy, robots have not replaced human 
labor. In fact, they have instead created more than 250,000 
high-paying jobs in the services sector since 1994. Digitali-
zation and automation thus bear considerable potential in 
terms of creating and securing jobs which, in turn, pro-
motes inclusion. This potential is undertapped – particu-
larly in the MINT fields, where many jobs remain open as 
several companies desperately seek to fill specialized train-
ing positions with future skilled labor. Germany must seize 
the opportunity to leverage innovation for greater inclu-
sion. This will require generating excitement for digitali-
zation in schools. The education system must target the 
goal of equipping students with the skills needed to navi-
gate an ever-changing world of work. Lifelong learning is 
also crucial to ensuring the inclusion of aging employees 
and employers. Digital infrastructure must also be tackled 
in order to close the gap in broadband deployment, par-
ticularly in rural areas.
Recommendation 10: 
Strengthen innovation
Germany needs innovation – it’s essential to ensuring 
productivity and long-term growth and prosperity. This 
means that its innovation efforts must change course. In 
the era of industrialization, Germany was a model for the 
benefits of an effective cooperation among industry, the 
state and academic research. Germany’s vocational train-
ing system has also traditionally been a leader on inter-
national comparison. This environment helped facilitate 
disruptive innovations that gave the German economy a 
technological advantage which, in turn, had a positive im-
pact on wages and job security. At present, innovations in 
the German economy are less disruptive – they are much 
more process innovations that have a limited effect on 
growth and jobs. The new legislative period must intro-
duce an initiative promoting Germany as the land of in-
novation. Spending on research and development must 
target more effectively efforts to sustainably increase 
productivity. Germany needs a strategy for venture capi-
tal in order to foster disruptive innovations. We also need 
a strategy to increase patent registrations if we are to 
sustain high standards in location quality. Regulatory 
policy can also help drive innovations by fostering greater 
competition among businesses in terms of best practices 
in driving innovation and growth.
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Germany is entering the beginning of a new legislative pe-
riod with a strong economic position. Current figures and 
forecasts for the near future are, across the board, positive.
But both the private sector and society are confronted with 
major challenges – globalization, digitalization and demo-
graphic shifts are transforming the demands on our econo-
my. In addition, growing income and participatory gaps be-
tween individuals and regions demand that we rethink the 
underpinnings of social cohesion and prosperity.
A new push for growth offers a solution to these issues.  
Indeed, growth that provides everyone an opportunity to 
benefit must be made a priority. In Germany, this requires 
policy makers to align economic and social policies as part 
of an Agenda for Inclusive Growth that can renew the pro-
mise of the social market economy and ensure prosperity 
for all.
In concrete terms, such an agenda can be broken down into 
five action areas: investment in people and future-oriented 
fields, targeted reform of the tax-and-transfer system, a 
new wealth policy, diversity in entrepreneurial culture and 
new directions in innovation policy.
Where precisely these should be applied, and how we can 
make growth more inclusive – these are the subjects of this 
publication.
Between 2014 and 2017, the Bertelsmann Stiftung conduct-
ed a project that fueled discussion in Germany about inter-
national approaches to inclusive growth proposed by the 
OECD and other bodies. Building on this, we worked with 
German economists to identify action areas, measures tar-
geting improvements in each, as well as the efficacy of 
these measures. The results of this process are the subject 
matter of this publication. Each action area has been the 
subject of close analysis documented in our “Inclusive 
Growth for Germany” series.
We wish to thank the following experts for their abiding 
support and collaboration throughout: Prof. Dr. Andreas 
Peichl and his team at the ZEW in Mannheim and at ifo in 
Munich, Prof. Tom Krebs, Ph.D., from the University of 
Mannheim and Prof. Dr. Martin Scheffel from the Universi-
ty of Cologne, Dr. Andreas Sachs and Markus Hoch from 
Prognos AG, Dr. Michael Böhmer at EY, Timm Bönke and 
his team at the FU Berlin, Prof. Dr. Thomas Lenk, Mario 
Hesse and their team at the Kompetenzzentrum Öffentliche 
Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur und Daseinsvorsorge e. V. at the 
University of Leipzig, Dr. Michael Thöne at the Institute for 
Public Economics at the University of Cologne, Prof. Dr. 
Wim Naudé and Dr. Paula Nagler from the universities of 
Maastricht and Rotterdam, and Prof. Dr. Friedrich Heine-
mann and his team at the Centre for European Economic 
Research in Mannheim.
We would also like to express our gratitude to everyone who 
participated in our workshops and conferences, sharing 
their knowledge and expertise with us in what proved to be 
a profoundly fruitful process.
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Germany’s national economy is currently in very good shape. 
While more than a few of its European neighbors are still 
feeling the after-effects of the financial crisis, the German 
economy issues one glowing progress report after another. 
Economic output has grown by more than 12 percent since 
2010. The number of people in employment rose to a total 
of 44.3 million in 2017. In Ocotober 2017, the unemploy-
ment rate stood at 5.4 percent – the lowest level since re-
unification. Employees’ net wages and salaries have risen 
by more than 1.5 percent since 2013. And the budget has not 
just been consolidated, it is returning surpluses.
This is an impressive state of affairs. However, these posi-
tive figures tell us nothing about the German economy’s 
capacity for dealing with social developments and global 
trends. Nor do these figures alone depict the social reality 
of Germany, and here it is important to consider three  
central challenges. The following challenges, which are 
changing the conditions of economic competition, have  
the potential to endanger social cohesion in Germany.
Why does Germany need inclusive growth?
FIGURE 1: Economic growth in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950 – 2015
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1.   Growth prospects are generally on the decline in 
industrialized countries, a development that is ex-
acerbated in Germany by the demographic shift
Germany’s economic growth may appear robust in Euro-
pean comparison, but this should not obscure the fact that 
after recovering quickly from the crisis, the German econ-
omy only grew by 0.5 percent per annum in both 2012 and 
2013 – a near recessionary rate. Mid-term growth pros-
pects – though promising, are hardly outstanding.
In the mid-term, it is the demographic shift that will prove 
to be the major brake on growth. As a society ages, the 
working population drops considerably. While the old-age 
dependency ratio was 24 in 1990, it is currently 34 and is 
projected to reach 58 by 2040. In a current study, the Co-
logne Institute for Economic Research proceeds from the 
assumption that Germany’s economic growth will more 
than halve by 2035. If this prognosis proves correct, the  
increase in the gross domestic product (GDP) would reduce 
to just 0.75 percent in 2035 (IW 2017).
But it is not just the demographic shift which is dampening 
growth prospects. Like many other industrialized countries, 
Germany has long recorded low productivity growth, despite 
accelerated technological transformation. Some economists 
refer to this phenomenon as social stagnation (see Berlin- 
Institut 2017). The record shows that there hasn’t been a 
phase of growth exceeding the 2 percent mark since the 
early 1990s (Fig.1, see Peichl et al.).
Stagnating growth coupled with the prospect of decline not 
only endangers the sustainability of public finances, it 
means that future generations will have to contend with 
lower standards of living (Fig. 2).
FIGURE 2: Productivity and income growth through 2035
Projected change in real GDP per capita and per person in employment from previous year, in percent
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2.   Globalization and digitalization are increasing 
competitive pressure and risks in the economic 
process
Globalization increases competition, while digitalization is 
fundamentally changing the way we work. Closely inter-
connected, these processes require constant structural 
change and adjustments to the education and training sys-
tem, in research and development, but also a modern, ro-
bust infrastructure with the capacity to adapt to shifting 
challenges – which is the backbone of any competitive 
economy.
However, a decline in investment over the years has raised 
doubts about German infrastructure and its fitness for the 
future. Digitalization presents the German economy and 
research landscape with new challenges to its capacity for 
innovation. It is primarily in process innovation that Ger-
man productive industries lead the rest of the world. This 
has made Germany a true world champion in exports. But 
the country hasn’t managed to keep pace in those areas 
where fundamental innovation is currently taking place, 
and it continues to lag far behind in terms of venture capi-
tal investment (Fig. 3). Along with the inherent vulnerabili-
ty of an export-oriented economy to external shocks, there 
is a growing risk that Germany will be left out in the cold as 
new markets emerge, or even that it may ultimately be-
come dependent on the new global players in the digital 
economy.
3.   Despite growth, participatory opportunities are 
increasingly unequal
We can see this first of all in the labor market. Even as Ger-
many approaches full employment, around one-tenth of its 
working population is dependent on unemployment bene-
fits. According to the Federal Employment Agency, in Au-
gust 2017, around 4.4 million people were drawing unem-
ployment benefits while around 1.7 million received income 
support. Over 20 percent of the working population is cur-
rently employed in the low-wage sector. Women with chil-
dren are often reliant on “mini-jobs” and part-time posi-
tions, usually with lower wages. Children from families 
with lower educational attainments have poor prospects for 
advancement, and their projected lifetime incomes are sig-
nificantly lower than those of their contemporaries from 
better-educated families (see Krebs and Scheffel 2017).
Structural changes in the labor market, in technological 
progress, as well as integration into global value creation 
FIGURE 3: Venture capital investment as percentage of GDP in the United States and Germany, 2007–2016
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Source: Naudé and Nagler 2017, Data used: Statista 
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chains and the decline in wage agreements (with only 
around half of employees still subject to such industry 
agreements) – these factors have all played a part in these 
developments. Indeed, they account in part for the widen-
ing income gap between qualified and less-qualified em-
ployees. And there will also be a greater gulf between those 
working in internationally successful technology compa-
nies and employees in an expanding service sector which is 
primarily focused on the domestic market; two-thirds of 
job growth in the last 20 years came from the areas of so-
cial services, public administration as well as education 
and training (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2015a). Models for dif-
ferent growth projections indicate that this development 
will intensify in any case (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2015b).
Internationally, too, economies of developed nations are 
seeing wages for the lower two-thirds of the population 
stagnating or falling, with only the upper third profiting 
from growth (Milanovic 2016; Tyson and Madgavkar 
2016). In its current Employment Outlook, the OECD 
points to increasing polarization in the labor market. 
While it seems that employment levels in most industrial-
ized countries are returning to pre-crisis levels, not 
everyone is profiting from this recovery. Lower and mid-
range wages are stagnating and the demand for mid-
range qualifications is declining. This is likely to lead to 
greater wage inequality (OECD 2017c).
At the same time, there is a worrying trend whereby 
growth and low unemployment no longer necessarily re-
duce the risk of poverty, or increase financial leeway for 
low-income earners. The “at-risk-of-poverty rate” has 
been steadily rising in Germany since 2006, reaching 15.7 
percent in 2015 – 1.7 percentage points higher than nine 
years ago. Across Germany, the duration of poverty has 
remained at a high average of over three years since 2002 
(Fig. 4; see also Peichl et al. 2017). In the last two decades, 
annual GDP per capita in Germany has increased from 
€ 19,754 in 1991 to € 36,211 in 2014. However, when ad-
justed with data on income distribution and poverty, GDP 
per capita has stagnated since 1991. Inclusive growth is 
not taking hold (Fig. 5; see also Peichl et al. 2017).
FIGURE 4: Risk of poverty by household type, 1962 – 2014
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 Multiperson households (<65), no children  Multiperson households (<65), with children  
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Source: Peichl et al. 2017: 41; Data used: Destatis 2016, SOEP (v.32), EVS 2016 
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Despite nominally increasing wages, low-income house-
holds – particularly those with single parents – are suf-
fering under the leap in the cost of living, particularly 
housing costs, and have no leeway for investing in their 
own education or that of their children, or to amass 
wealth (Sachs et al. 2017; SVR 2017: 419). Growing wealth 
inequality, and consequently income inequality, are the 
result (IWfD 10 2017).
Declining growth prospects and increasing adaptation re-
quirements accompanied by increasing risks of globaliza-
tion and digitalization as well as rising social inequality 
despite growth – these are the challenges that are already 
generating multiple conflicts in German society (see 
Bönke and Brinkmann 2015). Germany can confront these 
challenges by interlinking economic and social policy even 
more closely. And inclusive growth is the right model for 
achieving this.
 
17
Why focus on inclusive growth?
How can we increase growth and at the same time ensure 
that it is of greater benefit to all? This is a question that is 
increasingly being discussed under the concept of “inclu-
sive growth.” The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) uses the term in its quest for al-
ternative methods for measuring prosperity and developing 
economic policy recommendations, while the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
and the European Investment Bank (EIB) are all taking part 
in the debate (OECD 2017a; OECD 2014a; OECD 2014b; OECD 
2014c; Kireyev and Chen 2017; IWF 2017; WEF 2017; WEF 
and EIB 2017). And the European Union has presented its 
policy using this term as part of its Europe 2020 strategy.
The term is comparatively new to German debate. Beyond 
economic policy circles, inclusion has generally been dis-
cussed in terms of the complete and equal participation of 
all members of a society – regardless of their background, 
ethnic identity, ability or other characteristics. People 
should be able to participate in all societal processes. The 
concept of inclusion has most prominently been used in 
Germany to describe the integration of people with disabi-
lities into the formal labor market and the mainstream  
education system.
Development economists first applied the term “inclusive 
growth” around the beginning of the millennium. The ini-
tial idea behind this was that the world’s poor should be in 
a position to profit from economic upturns in their coun-
tries. It was in this context that inclusive growth estab-
lished itself as an independent term (Lopez 2011). And it  
is with this sense that international organizations like the 
IMF and the World Bank also use now the term (de Mello 
and Dutz 2012; Koch 2017).
It was only in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis 
that the term increasingly spread beyond development  
economics to economic and social policy discourse in in-
dustrialized countries. The concept brings together two 
strains of discussion. On the one hand, there is the long- 
running discussion around a more comprehensive concep-
tion of prosperity to replace GDP. Around the early 1990s, 
criticism of GDP as an indicator of prosperity increased. 
Critics complained that it failed to represent factors such as 
quality of life, the environmental and financial sustainabil-
ity of growth or issues of participation. This debate also 
drew in the OECD, the German Bundestag and the federal 
government, each of which examined alternative methods 
of measuring prosperity that might result in political  
measures (OECD 2015; Deutscher Bundestag 2013; Bundes-
regierung 2016).
The second strain of discussion developed in numerous 
OECD member states around 2008, in the immediate wake 
of the financial crisis. Here the key question was: How 
could these countries return to a stable path of growth, and 
how could this growth be configured in such a way that 
those who were particularly affected by the economic 
downturn and the ensuing state debt crisis would profit  
directly from the return to growth? It was the OECD that 
drove this discussion (OECD 2014a; OECD 2014b).
However, this discussion didn’t end with crisis-affected 
countries. It became increasingly clear that the fundamen-
tal challenges facing Germany described earlier would also 
see other industrialized countries confronted with growth 
that came with increasing social inequality and greater risk 
to vulnerable elements of their populations. At the same 
time, the traditional systems and instruments of social  
equity came under increasing pressure. For these reasons 
the OECD is now joined by numerous international organi-
zations and think tanks like the WEF (2017), the Center for 
American Progress (2015) and Bertelsmann Stiftung in the 
search for inclusive growth in industrialized countries.
Why focus on inclusive growth?
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While there is no universally applicable definition of the 
term inclusive growth, there are three elements that are 
common to every approach:
1)  Growth is a necessary prerequisite for inclusive growth. 
An assumption inherent in every actor’s concept is that 
GDP growth is the key to raising the general standard of 
living. This puts the concept of inclusive growth at odds 
with the position of many critics of growth.
2)  All actors recognize that economic growth cannot be an 
end in itself. It’s not just about how much growth a na-
tional economy can generate. Rather, the broader issues 
addressed are the conditions in which growth is gener-
ated and who profits from this growth. Most definitions 
focus here on reducing concrete indicators of inequality 
and increasing societal participation among disadvan-
taged sectors of the population.
3)  Another – essentially new – element common to the 
various approaches is that inclusive growth as a concept 
is intended to redefine the relationship between eco-
nomic policy and social policy by anchoring both in 
principles of equity and participation. The social welfare 
state is a great historical achievement. It is the institu-
tions of the social welfare state and its redistribution 
mechanisms that moderate the distribution inequality 
that arises from economic processes. However, as condi-
tions in the globalized and digitalized economy intensi-
fy, these instruments are at risk of structural overload in 
the longer term. From the other side comes an economic 
policy perspective that regards increased competitive-
ness and more efficient economic processes as para-
mount. However, this inevitably aggravates inequalities 
and intensifies the pressures borne by the social welfare 
state – a conflict of objectives for which those advocat-
ing various concepts of inclusive growth aim to answer. 
How can the scope of participatory opportunities be ex-
panded within and by the economic process?
FIGURE 5: Indicator of inclusive growth and GDP per capita, 1991–2015
  Adjusted-for-inclusive-growth GDP per capita, in euro  Real non-adjusted GDP per capita, in euro
The indicator for inclusive growth reflects GDP per capita adjusted with data on income distribution and poverty.
Source: Peichl et al. 2017: 43; Data used: Destatis 2016, SOEP (v.32), EVS 2016 
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The call for inclusive growth is now being heard in German 
politics. Before Sigmar Gabriel switched from the Economic 
Ministry to Foreign Affairs, he presented the Annual Eco-
nomic Report for 2017 (BMWi 2017a) with the subheading 
“For inclusive growth in Germany and Europe.” His suc-
cessor, Brigitte Zypries, soon picked up on this by presen-
ting a ten-point plan for inclusive growth in Germany 
(BMWi 2017b).
This well-argued Economics Ministry paper is on target. 
Germany should be considering the issue of inclusive 
growth. It must not become a function of partisan politics. 
In this new legislative period specifically, all economic po-
licy actors must make it their task to ensure that inclusive 
growth doesn’t become a buzzword for one or other politi-
cal camp. Particularly in Germany, the country that inven-
ted the concept of a social market economy, every actor 
should be aware that growth and participation, productivity 
and the cohesion of society must always be considered in 
concert. Political parties that wish to see the continuation 
of the social market economy cannot afford to ignore this.
And social partners who see Germany as more than just a 
production factor must subscribe to the goal of inclusive 
growth. We should see the current situation as an oppor-
tunity for a complete rethink of how we wish to grow while 
ensuring the maximum number of people can profit from 
this growth. A proper debate around inclusive growth must 
aim at making the German growth model fit for the future.
Germany can grow inclusively. There are strategic options 
for inclusive growth in five action areas. The Bertelsmann 
Stiftung has analyzed each of these fields in collaboration 
with specialists and developed recommendations that form 
the basis for an agenda of inclusive growth. We call for:
1. public investment in people and future-oriented fields;
2.  an increase in employment incentives and a reduction of 
inequality through reforms targeting the interaction of 
taxes, duties and transfers;
3.  a coherent and goal-oriented wealth policy that reduces 
wealth inequality and allows more people to participate 
in the opportunities of growth;
4.  a new entrepreneurial culture built on the recognition 
that Germany is characterized by diversity and that 
companies run by people with a migrant background 
make a significant contribution to economic perfor-
mance and social mobility; and
5.  a rethink aimed at a new policy of innovation that will 
return Germany to the peak of technological develop-
ment.
Options for a new growth strategy
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In a modern economy, investments are a key instrument 
for increasing economic growth and thus contributing to 
increased societal prosperity. Technological advances, the 
success of companies and the creation of qualified jobs are 
all impossible without modern capital stock. To ensure 
that Germany remains a business location equipped with 
the capacity to offer future generations prosperity and 
employment, investment must be undertaken today. This 
is where public funds have a particular role to play.
We have developed a number of scenarios to test how in-
creased investment would impact Germany’s economic 
development. They all conclude that greater public invest-
ment in the right areas would lead to higher GDP growth 
and to a more just distribution in the coming years. In-
creased investment would also result in greater growth in 
productivity, work volumes and the capital stock of the 
state while reducing the debt burden on the next genera-
tion. Germany must be prepared to spend money to reduce 
its investment deficit.
For all its economic strength, the country lags behind in 
investment. Between 2005 and 2014, the state made an 
average of 2.2 percent of its GDP available for develop-
ment of roads, schools and preschools. In the same period, 
OECD countries as a whole put 3.3 percent of their GDP 
into investments. The German Institute for Economic  
Research (DIW) points to an average investment gap of  
3 percent of GDP, or € 75 billion per year, for the period 
1999 to 2012, when comparing Germany with the eurozone 
as a whole.
Finally, the Association of German Chambers of Commerce 
compared Germany with 17 other industrialized countries 
and found a cumulative investment shortfall of over € 600 
billion between 2003 and 2012. The OECD has repeatedly 
warned of a loss of value in Germany’s public capital stock 
(most recently: OECD 2017a).
Even allowing for a more broader view of investment – 
taking into account federal, state, city and regional au-
thorities spending on property maintenance, leases and 
rents – does not change this poor picture of German in-
vestment (Hesse et al. 2017). And the need is great. A view 
of educational expenditure per pupil shows that Germany 
is in the midfield in comparison with other OECD coun-
tries, and at the primary and secondary levels expenditure 
is, in fact, below the OECD average (OECD 2016). Accord-
ing to Germany’s development bank, the KfW banking 
group, German schools alone require around € 33 billion. 
Here it is the local authorities, along with roads and trans -
port infrastructure, which have the greatest shortfall.
According to their own estimates, the local authorities’  
investment gap was € 136 billion in 2016 (Scheller et al. 
2017). A comparison with the previous year does at least 
indicate a slight easing here. However, urgently required 
investments are still outstanding (Hesse et al. 2017).
In the previous legislative period, an expert commission 
was convened at the invitation of the Federal Economics 
Ministry; its recommendations included a call for a com-
mitment to greater public investment (Expertenkommis-
sion 2015). In two studies, we examined what the impact 
of this increased investment would be. Developed in col-
laboration with Prognos AG, the study “Balanced Budget 
and Investment Rule: Two Sides of the Same Coin?!” in-
cluded five scenarios that calculated the projected impact 
on the growth of investments of varying scale, particularly 
for public buildings, roads and transport infrastructure  
(Böhmer et al. 2017).
Were Germany to leave its rate of investment unchanged, 
by 2025 the average GDP would be 1.4 percent per year. 
But if Germany were to raise its investments from 2.2 per-
cent to the OECD average of 3.3 percent of GDP, growth 
would rise to 1.6 percent per year. Germany would be able 
to generate an extra € 80 billion. Greater investment 
Action area 1:  
Investing in people and the future
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would result in a weaker state budget balance in the short 
term, but in the long term, the increased economic growth 
would have a positive effect on public finances. In every 
model projection, the current debt level of 70 percent 
would fall to below 50 percent in 2025 (IWfD 07 2017).
Tom Krebs from the Chair of Macroeconomics at the Uni-
versity of Mannheim and Martin Scheffel from the Center 
for Macroeconomic Research (CMR) at the University of 
Cologne have undertaken an even more detailed examina-
tion of the three areas of public investment activity which 
have the greatest need for action and which thus offer the 
highest prospects for return – preschools and schools, 
residential construction as well as transport and digital 
infrastructures. Using a previous needs analysis of these 
three fields as their basis, they calculated the effect on 
growth, employment, distribution and fiscal sustainability 
using a microfounded macroeconomic model.
The nationwide expansion of all-day schools with a super - 
vision quotient of 80 percent and an optimal staffing ratio 
in preschools would require around € 10.4 billion per year. 
Making this investment would increase the educational 
success of children and thus expand their later opportuni-
ties in the labor market. Improved childcare would also 
increase the working opportunities available to women. 
The impact is significant – in 2020 the GDP would be 
€ 11.4 billion higher than it would be without investment, 
with a differential of € 35.1 billion in 2020 and € 56.7 bil-
lion in 2050.
Employment, too, would profit greatly from an investment 
program aimed to strengthen childcare, with more than 
half a million additional full-time equivalent (FTE) posi-
tions by 2050 invoving a corresponding reduction of un-
employment equivalent to over 346,400 positions in 2050. 
The investments would be amortized in 16 years and 
would have generated a return of almost 12 percent. They 
would also have a positive effect on the government debt 
ratio, which would fall by around five percentage points by 
2050. Moreover, this investment would have a particularly 
positive effect on the incomes of single mothers, mothers 
with children and adults raised in families with lower ed-
ucational attainments. Income inequality would fall (Krebs 
and Scheffel 2017).
We are convinced that Germany’s investment gap can only 
be closed with a long-term spending program. The goal is 
to increase investment to guarantee a long-term planning 
horizon at every level and for all participants. Naturally, 
this also requires the availability of the requisite adminis-
trative capacities – particularly in local authorities. There-
fore, the correct solution is to examine options for long-
term, targeted investments in line with the principles of 
inclusive growth.
It is clear that we cannot burden future generations with 
an excess of debt. This was the thinking behind the debt 
brake, which in 2020 will be extended to Germany’s states. 
While it is a valuable instrument for keeping expenditure 
under control, it is only one side of the equation. Burden-
ing future generations by failing to sufficiently invest in 
the future is not a sustainable approach. This means that 
fiscal sustainability cannot be controlled exclusively by the 
debt rules enshrined in law, and thus the expenses side. 
Instead, public assets must be secured for the present 
generation and, above all, for future generations. Just as 
Germany has introduced rules for amassing debt, it also 
requires rules for stabilizing investments. Vacillating be-
tween large-scale expenditure and ruthless austerity 
comes at a cost to economic substance.
During the last legislative period, 
the federal government increased public investment activity 
by more than  
40 percent 
€ 5 billion 
per year
 € 10.4 billion
per year
Data from the KfW Group’s Kommunalpanel show the investment
shortfall among municipalities in Germany to have reached 
€ 126 billion 
Increase public investment 
in three key areas
Recommended actionBaseline
Yet the gross investment ratio has hovered 
at just over 2 percent for more than 10 years 
 and is thus below the rate observed in the 1990s.
Other necessary reforms
Affordable housing for lower- and middle-
income earners 
Modern digital infrastructure
Regulations that help 
stabilize investments 
and debt (debt brake)
Good childcare (daycare and all-day schools)
Public investment generates 
growth and prosperity
Eﬀects
2020
€ 14.2 billion
% %
Government debt ratio of 66 percent falls
by 4.93 percentage points by 2050.
Public investment .. .
GDP
2030 2050
€ 50.8 billion 
€ 96.9 billion
+629,200
more in employment by 2050
–441,400
fewer unemployed by 2050
A sustained increase in public investment targeting childcare, 
affordable housing and a modern digital infrastructure 
fosters growth and prosperity.
€ 5 billion
per year
2020 2030 2050
–1.08 
–0.61 
–0.28 
Poverty rate (in percentage points)
. . .  reduces debt ...  increases growth
...  creates jobs
...  reduces poverty
...  reduces unemployment 
Despite its strong economic position, Germany lags 
behind in terms of making the necessary investments
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The German tax-and-transfer system, underpinned by the 
principle that strong shoulders should bear more than 
weak ones, ensures that the net income of citizens is more 
equitably distributed than market incomes. A progressive 
tax-and-transfer system that promotes growth while cre-
ating employment incentives and strengthening public fi-
nances is a significant element of any agenda for inclusive 
growth. Herein lies the problem with the German system 
– as critics frequently point out, it is averse to growth and 
incentives. The OECD, the European Commission and oth-
er international organizations bemoan the fact that sec-
ondary earners as well as those on low or medium in-
comes face a particularly high burden of taxes and social 
contributions (see OECD 2017b; European Commission 
2016).
In international comparisons, Germany emerges as a 
country with a high rate of income distribution. The ex-
tensive social security system is not just intended to help 
combat poverty, but also to help secure the living stand-
ards of older people, or those who are ill or unemployed. 
State transfers are the largest line item in the country’s 
budget, with annual spending of around 18 percent of 
GDP. It is therefore even more important that money is 
deployed where it can help and where it has the greatest 
impact. Aside from basic income, analysis by the German 
Institute for Economic Research shows that many trans-
fers do not benefit the needy, but rather members of the 
middle class or even the affluent (Bach et al. 2015).
Consequently, one target on the road to inclusive growth 
should be reforms to the tax-and-transfer system that in-
crease individual employment incentives, allow for a bal-
anced budget and prevent income from being inequitably 
distributed. International studies show that reforms have 
the greatest impact when they increase incentives to enter 
employment. Whether or not the tax-and-transfer system 
creates incentives is particularly apparent from the effec-
tive marginal burden.
The effective marginal burden indicates how much of each 
extra euro earned must be relinquished. This occurs 
through income tax, social contributions or from the fact 
of social transfers being withdrawn once an unemployed 
person re-enters employment, or a family draws an addi-
tional wage upon a second partner taking a job. Since re-
unification there have been various attempts to reduce 
this burden through lower marginal income tax rates and 
higher tax allowances. However, the German system of 
taxes, duties and transfers still has the disadvantage that 
the burden on mid-range incomes increases relatively 
sharply (OECD 2017b).
With regard to inclusive growth, the effect of the tax-and-
transfer system on the lower income range is also rele-
vant. Here it is important to pay particular attention to the 
interplay of the tax-and-transfer system. We therefore 
commissioned a report from the European Centre for Eco-
nomic Research in Mannheim (ZEW) that investigated  
the incentive effect of different regulations in the German 
tax-and-transfer system. One focal point here was on  
how these regulations interact and affect each other  
(Buhlmann et al. 2017).
The report’s findings show that the effective marginal 
burden for broad income levels deviates significantly from 
the familiar tax rates, such as the income tax rate. Among 
lower incomes, the marginal burden from withdrawal of 
transfers is particularly high and typically ranges between 
80 percent and 100 percent. Once entitlement to transfers 
expires, the effective marginal burden through taxes and 
duties tends to range between 40 percent and 60 percent. 
In the current system, a single-income household with an 
annual net income of € 17,000 receives nothing from each 
additionally earned euro. A single-income household with 
an annual net income of € 75,000, on the other hand,  
retains 56 cents from each additionally earned euro.
Action area 2:  
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There are frequent discontinuities in disposable income, 
whereby the positive effect of increased wages is exceeded 
by the withdrawal of transfers. This means that additional 
work – on a small scale, at least – just isn’t worthwhile in 
some cases. These discontinuities must be removed for the 
tax-and-transfer system to create greater employment 
incentives and make its contribution to inclusive growth. 
Here the ZEW has developed various reform recommenda-
tions.
In order to estimate the real-life impact of these reforms, 
they were played out in simulations using a representative 
dataset of the population. This revealed how the recom-
mendations would impact employment, income distribu-
tion and the state budget. For years, politicians have been 
calling for a reduction in the “middle class bulge” – that 
is, the particularly steep rise in progressive tax rates for 
low-income earners. In fact, the ZEW found that this was 
the most effective way of increasing employment. But this 
step would have a somewhat negative effect on income 
distribution. Such a reform would also see a marked drop 
of € 37.28 billion in income to state accounts.
Moreover, such a reform would barely reach the lower two 
deciles of income distribution. The average equiva-
lence-weighted relief impact would be about nil for the 
lowest decile, around € 40 for the second decile and 
around € 1,253 for the top decile, which means that two of 
the intended targets would have been missed. To reduce 
the negative distribution impact and to advance closer to-
ward inclusive growth, further steps would be necessary in 
this scenario. For instance, one option would be to in-
crease the top income rate.
Comprehensive impact representing the greatest possible 
degree of inclusive growth could be achieved through an-
other combination of reform steps: unemployment bene-
fits, housing allowance and child supplements could be 
integrated into a “new” transfer with a constant transfer 
withdrawal rate of 60 percent. This rate would mean that 
the available income of a household that receives transfers 
would always increase by 40 cents for each additional euro 
of net income. Moreover, the joint tax deduction for mar-
ried couples, which has previously offered little incentive 
for both partners to work, could be replaced by an actual 
joint tax deduction with a transferable maximum amount.
In contrast to the status quo, married partners would es-
sentially be individually taxed, but the first earner would 
be able to transfer up to € 13,805 of his or her taxable in-
come to the second earner. Such a reform would increase 
employment by over 27,300 FTE positions, reduce ine-
quality – by expanding work opportunities, particularly to 
women – and increase public income by a total of more 
than € 5 billion.
These steps would lead to increased employment and, at 
the same time, result in a slight reduction of income ine-
quality. The introduction of actual splitting would also 
slightly increase tax revenues. And introduction of a con-
stant transfer withdrawal rate would have a number of 
positive effects. Lower incomes, in particular, would rise 
appreciably. More people would enter employment. Be-
cause this would also have to integrate the basic income, 
housing allowance and child supplement, there would be 
lower administrative expenditure (Buhlmann et al. 2017).
Baseline
Germany’s tax-and-transfer system
Interaction of German tax, duty and transfer systems
How much of each additional earned euro is left (netto) after social transfers,
 income tax and social contributions have been deducted?
For lower-income earners, additional work and increased income could spell for less disposable income. 
Top earners retain more of each additional euro earned. 
Effective marginal burden
Recommendations and eﬀects
Strong shoulders should bear a heavier burden
Recommend reform 1:
Transfer withdrawal rate
transfer withdrawal 
rate
60 %
Recommended reform 2:
Replace the Ehegattensplitting (a joint tax deduction for married couples that disincentivizes employment for both) 
with an actual joint tax deduction (maximum transfer of € 13,805).
Incentivizing employment: 40 cents of 
each additional euro is retained.
Taxes, duties and transfers should be harmonized 
to even out the effective marginal burden and to make sure 
that additional work is always worthwhile.
Female employment 
increases by 
approximately 27,300.
Public revenue 
increases by 
approximately € 5 billion.
€ 0.40€ 1
More people 
take up employment 
(137,700).
Savings in public administration costs Employment incentives increase
Single household Couple with two children, 
one income-earner
€ 75,000 € 90,000
 € 0.66
 € 0.56€ 0
 € 0.56
€ 17,000 € 40,000
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“Prosperity for all,” Ludwig Erhard’s motto for the social 
market economy, applied to income and wealth in equal 
measure from the outset. The German economic and social 
order should allow the population as a whole to participate 
in increasing prosperity. While politicians in recent years 
have concentrated on income, wealth has returned to fo-
cus in the current debate around inequality. Recommend-
ed solutions continue to revolve around the issue of how 
the state can distribute wealth through taxes – through 
inheritance and wealth taxes, for instance.
But state wealth promotion is falling short. So, together 
with Timm Bönke and his team from the Freie Universität 
Berlin, we examined the question of whether current 
funding instruments are capable of fostering wealth crea-
tion (Bönke and Brinkmann 2017). In a rapidly changing 
labor environment, it is vital for the participation of fur-
ther sectors of the population and thus for greater inclu-
sive growth that wealth inequality, and consequently in-
come inequality, be cushioned.
Since the mid-1980s, owners of capital have increasingly 
profited from economic growth, while this is less so the 
case for wage earners. The labor market alone no longer 
guarantees broad-based economic participation. Some 
households are even worse off than those in the preceding 
generation (Bartels and Jenderney 2015). Wealth creation is 
becoming more difficult, not just for low-income earners, 
but in the mid-range sector as well (Sachs et al. 2017).
When you examine how disposable household incomes 
have developed between 2002 and 2012 in Germany, an 
alarming picture emerges – the lower 60 percent have ex-
perienced an above-average growth in disposable equiva-
lent household income and the lower 30 percent have ac-
tually seen their incomes drop in real terms in the course 
of those ten years. That the lower two-thirds of the popu-
lation have seen their incomes decline or stagnate while 
the upper third are profiting from growth is a phenome-
non seen not just in Germany, but also in other developed 
economies throughout the world (Milanovic 2016; Tyson 
and Madgavkar 2016).
A view of working-life incomes, that is, the income that 
an employee subject to social contributions earns through - 
out his or her entire working life, from first job to retire-
ment, completes this picture of income development. It is 
striking that those born in 1950 or earlier have profited 
equally from growth, regardless of where they stand in the 
income distribution scale. For those born later, the situa-
tion has changed dramatically. While the upper working- 
life incomes experienced moderate growth and the mid-
range tended to stagnate or fall slightly, incomes at the 
lowest level have dropped considerably.
Here income earners are losing out in real terms and fall-
ing to the working-life income levels of those born in 
1937. This can be explained by increased interruptions to 
professional careers, with long phases of unemployment 
and falling actual wages and shifts in employment. It is 
particularly the less-qualified born after 1950 who are af-
fected. This polarization impacts statutory pension allow-
ances and retirement benefits (Bönke et al. 2015).
Current studies indicate that 50 percent of private wealth 
is held by around 5 percent of households (Grabka and 
Westermeier 2015). The real net wealth of private German 
households actually shrunk by more than 15 percent be-
tween 2002 and 2012. This is particularly surprising con-
sidering that the savings ratio in the same period was 
about 10 percent of income. So what happened? The nega-
tive real returns for private wealth can be partly explained 
by the fact that prices for owner-occupied property were 
in decline up until 2010. On the other hand, private house-
holds are not investing their money profitably. Besides 
owner-occupied property, they prefer to put their money 
in liquid yet low-return investments such as savings or 
current accounts. In periods of extremely low interest 
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rates, low current income with negative real interest rates 
results in a devaluation of wealth. Private wealth is thus 
decoupled from the development of the national economy.
From this, we see that it is the quality, not the quantity, of 
household investments that is problematic. Germans are 
particularly averse to investing in productive capital. 
Shareholding is still uncommon (Deutsche Bundesbank 
2016). In 2014 only 10 percent of households held shares. 
But for the wealthiest 20 percent of the income distribu-
tion, this proportion was 32 percent. The proportion of 
households who own funds has even declined. There is 
also no discernible trend toward greater share ownership. 
In fact, the number of shareholders fell once again in 
2014. On the one hand, there is widespread complaint 
about low-interest policies and the so-called “expropria-
tion” of German savers. On the other hand, few take ad-
vantage of the opportunity to profit from a bull market 
which has endured for years now. The security argument 
which is so often used barely holds water in time of state 
debt crises and negative real interest rates. Perhaps, as  
is often claimed, there is a more emotional aversion to 
shares. Bolstering financial knowledge could be one option 
for supporting households in wealth creation.
From this perspective, German wealth policies present a 
sobering picture. They have not cleared the path to wealth 
for all sectors of society. It is those who have less need of 
state support who are profiting most from current pro-
grams. The bulk of support is currently going into rigid, 
complicated pension scheme products which combine high 
administrative costs with low returns. Politicians should 
instead turn their focus to a wide range of capital invest-
ments with lower risk profiles. Wealth creation should be 
supported in a way that every level of society can profit 
from the productive capital of society. Investment oppor-
tunities must be flexible, transparent and readily compre-
hensible, accessible to all without excess bureaucracy. Ad-
ministrative costs should be kept as low as possible. And 
above all, there should be a healthy risk-benefit ratio.
There are three aspects which should be front and center 
in any reform of wealth policies. There should be fewer 
instruments, but more money should be put into them. 
Secondly, politicians should no longer concentrate so 
heavily on pension schemes – people should be free to de-
cide how they use their wealth. And in a shifting labor en-
vironment there must be an urgent rethink in the coupling 
of payments and contracts to employment relationships. 
All this would bring the urgently required flexibility and 
discretionary power over personal wealth. Finally, a cost- 
effective basic package freely available to all would further 
increase the appeal of wealth creation. If private providers 
are unable to offer such a product, the state should step in 
with a solution. One example of this is the Swedish bond 
fund (Bönke and Brinkmann 2017).
It is clear from a view of functional income distribution 
and wealth development that the problem will only grow 
in the future and therefore undermine public trust and 
faith in the institutions underlying a social market econo-
my. So there is much to be said for rapid reform and active 
revitalization of wealth policy in Germany.
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New wealth fell by more than 15 % from 2002 to 2012, although the savings 
rate hovered at 10 % of income. This is attributed in part to an ineffective 
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households with limited assets build their wealth. These investment opportunities should 
not be coupled with an employment contract or pension scheme and thereby allow 
flexibility in access to one’s assets.
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Germany rarely fares well in international comparative 
studies on entrepreneurial activity. These studies repeat-
edly show that fewer new companies are being estab-
lished here than elsewhere (Sternberg and von Bloh 2017). 
This is also an indicator of a healthy labor market. Wher-
ever secure, well-paid jobs are on offer, fewer people are 
inclined to take the leap into self-employment with its 
inherent risk and major challenges (Evers 2017; Metzger 
2017).
But the strength of the social market economy is not 
based on the success of major corporations alone. It is 
based on a diverse, high-performing landscape of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Calculations of the 
Institute for SME Research in Bonn (IfM Bonn) show that 
around 3.45 million companies in Germany are SMEs – 
99.6 percent of all companies. In 2015, they generated 
more than € 2.2 trillion and contributed almost 55 per-
cent to overall net value creation in the German economy. 
It is the employment effect of SMEs that is particularly 
overwhelming – 16.85 million people were working for 
SMEs in 2015. This represents 58.5 percent of all employ-
ees subject to social contributions. At the same time, 
SMEs employ 81.8 percent of all trainees (IfM Bonn 2017).
But the SME landscape will only remain successful with 
constant additions of newly founded companies. This is 
because growth is not solely generated through the ex-
pansion of production capacities in existing companies. 
Those who found companies contribute to an improved 
competitive climate by bringing innovative business ideas 
to existing sectors or driving development in whole new 
areas of business. In this way, they increase pressure on 
established companies to become more efficient and crea-
tive rather than resting on their laurels (Piegeler and Röhl 
2015; Metzger 2014).
With this in mind, it is worrying that the number of com-
pany founders in Germany continues to fall. The KfW 
Start-up Monitor 2017 shows that the number of company 
founders fell to a new low in 2016. At 672,000 individuals 
this is 91,000 fewer who have entered self-employment 
than in the previous year (Metzger 2017). Germany’s 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) Start-up 
Report 2017 paints a similar picture with a view to the 
number of discussions with founders conducted by the 
chambers of commerce. In 2016, they fell for the sixth 
year in succession (Evers 2017).
But there is one trend which offers cause for optimism – 
people with a migrant background are taking part in en-
trepreneurial activity in Germany in ever greater num-
bers. Introducing new ideas, they are enlivening the 
private sector with startups and mid-sized companies. In 
2014, around 40 percent of all business founders in Ger-
many had non-German citizenship. In all, the proportion 
of foreign business founders in the private sector has 
more than doubled since 2005 (Kay and Günterberg 2015; 
see also Bijedić et al. 2017).
But founders without German citizenship only form a 
small subsection of a diverse society. Those with a mi-
grant background – that is, people with or without Ger-
man citizenship who either migrated themselves or have 
at least one parent who did so – is much larger. In 2014, 
this encompassed 16.4 million people in Germany; 
709,000 of these were self-employed in 2014, according 
to an analysis of microcensus data carried out by Prognos 
AG and commissioned by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (Sachs 
et al. 2016).
But it is not just the quantitative contribution made by 
people with a migrant background to entrepreneurialism 
in Germany that is remarkable. The qualitative dimen-
sions of the trends are also compelling. People with a mi-
grant background have extensive familiarity and good re-
lations with their countries of origin, which means they 
can help open up new markets and internationalize the 
Action area 4:  
A new entrepreneurial culture
Options for a new growth strategy
33
German mid-sized sector which, in 2015, accounted for 
17.1 percent of the export revenues of all German compa-
nies (IfM Bonn 2017).
And entrepreneurs with a migrant background are in-
creasingly moving away from the old clichés about gro-
cery stores and fast-food outlets. The range of sectors in 
which immigrants have been founding businesses has 
been changing for years. In 2005, 38 percent of the 
self-employed with a migrant background were active in 
retail and catering; this proportion has fallen by 10 per-
cent over the last ten years. A far greater proportion of 
the self-employed with a migrant background is now in 
other service sectors, and in the productive industries 
(Sachs et al. 2016; Leicht and Langhauser 2014; Bijedić et 
al. 2017).
Entrepreneurs with a migrant background also make a 
major contribution to Germany’s positive employment 
levels. We commissioned a study which showed that be-
tween 2005 and 2014, the number of employees subject to 
social contributions employed by migrant companies had 
risen from 947,000 to 1.3 million (Sachs et al. 2016). Mi-
grants who successfully establish and operate businesses 
also increase their opportunities for earning greater in-
come. In Germany, this is a highly relevant topic for mi-
grants and their offspring as they still tend to earn less 
than those without a migrant background as our study 
(ibid.) and that of the DIW (Grabka et al. 2016) show.
Politicians would be well advised to offer greater support 
for immigrants and their offspring on the road to self- 
employment than they have to date. The economic contri-
bution of migrant companies is already considerable. 
When you add the opportunity for increased income for 
the self-employed and their model character as examples 
of successful integration, migrant entrepreneurs are 
doubtless already an engine for inclusive growth.
A better-equipped advisory infrastructure could contrib-
ute to the success of entrepreneurial plans (García Schmidt  
and Dierks 2016). Moreover, institutional barriers to self- 
employment must be removed (OECD 2017a; Niemann  
and García Schmidt 2015). Residency permits and settle-
ment procedures for non-EU nationals should be simpli-
fied. Finally, migrants must be better involved in central 
regulatory institutions of the economy. In the long term, 
one particular key to increasing the number of businesses 
founded lies in education (Sachs et al. 2016).
Baseline
Increasing numbers of people with a migrant background 
are founding businesses in Germany. The social market economy 
is dependent on the creation of new SMEs.
Recommendations
Facilitate the creation of more new companies, 
and enhance migrant entrepreneurs’ potential 
Entrepreneurs with a migrant background create jobs
Expand target-group-specific advisory 
services that help new companies 
achieve sustainable success 
Further reduce bureaucratic and 
institutional hurdles to company creation 
in Germany
Make it simpler for self-employed people 
from non-EU countries to obtain residence visas
Integrate entrepreneurs with a migrant background 
more strongly into business institutions
Provide more financial resources to support company creation. 
More venture capital must be made available to entrepreneurs 
in innovative areas.
Creation of migrant-owned businesses
SMEs are important factors in the social market economy’s performance
Self-employed entrepreneur 
with a migrant background
Self-employed migrants earn more than conventionally employed people 
2005
€ 1,274
2014
€ 1,537
2005
€ 2,498
2014
€ 2,994
Self-employed with a migrant background Self-employed people with a migrant background create jobs
%
58 %
of all employed 
people
%
82 %
of all 
apprentices
99.6 % of all 
businesses in Germany 
are SMEs.
SMEs contribute nearly 55 % to value creation in Germany
%
Average monthly 
net income
Higher income – 
less inequality and 
risk of poverty
Good international relationships with their countries
of origin are a benefit, facilitating internationalization 
and the development of new markets.
Employees 
with a migrant background
567,000
2005
709,000
2014
947,000
2005
1,284,000
2014+32 %+9 %
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Germany’s processing industries require innovation to 
remain competitive, to continue producing outstanding 
goods, and to retain their leadership as exporters and  
employers. Digitalization, in particular, offers enormous 
potential for creating new, future-oriented jobs, which 
can foster participation and inclusive growth. But these 
innovations are also associated with risks, as automation 
can replace jobs and exacerbate social inequality. Digitali-
zation can lead to a fragmented labor market which un-
dermines existing protective mechanisms.
Are the challenges facing Germany attributable to digital-
ization and similar trends alone, as is often stated? Ex-
planations for the increase in income inequality in in-
dustrialized countries often reference the technical 
innovations of recent years. These developments, it 
seems, will replace jobs carried out by humans and result 
in a disproportionate increase in the income of particu-
larly well-qualified experts (Acemoglu and author 2010). 
An Oxford University study forecasts that more than half 
of all the jobs in Germany could fall victim to the coming 
wave of automation (Frey and Osborne 2015). The specter 
of the job-destroying robot is also ubiquitous in the  
media.
However, to date, there have been few indications that 
things really will be this grim. Instead, the reason for the 
increased inequality in wages since the 1990, according to 
an analysis by economists Wim Naudé from the University 
of Maastricht and Paula Nagler from the University of 
Rotterdam, is precisely the opposite – Germany’s com-
paratively weak and declining successes in technical in-
novation (IWfD 19 2017). Campaigns would have us be-
lieve that Germany is the “land of ideas,” a leader in 
technical development. And admittedly the numbers are 
impressive – Germany spends a large and growing 
amount on research and development.
The total research expenditure of state and private insti-
tutions combined exceeded the € 90 billion mark for the 
first time in 2015. In that year alone, more than 400,000 
scientists were working on innovations in business. Most 
of them were helping to keep Germany’s global lead in 
the productive industries competitive. This sector ac-
counts for a quarter of all jobs in Germany and ensures 
the strength of German exports.
But this doesn’t necessarily mean that productivity is ris-
ing rapidly in Germany. In fact, it has been dropping 
steadily since the 1970s. This doesn’t fit with the image  
of rapid technical innovation nor with the idea of the pro-
ductive robot replacing human workers on a large scale 
(Yglesias 2015).
True, Germany remains a leader in traditional sectors 
such as the auto industry and machine construction. 
Through process innovations and specialized product in-
novations, German companies have retained global mar-
ket leader status in strictly defined areas, in some cases 
over decades. This applies not only to Germany’s global 
players like the auto industry, but also to many highly 
specialized mid-sized companies which, in contrast to 
many of their foreign competitors, seize the opportunities 
of globalization primarily through their research edge. It 
is precisely these hidden champions who have secured 
employment in Germany, while the economies of coun-
tries such as the UK and the USA have undergone painful 
deindustrialization processes in recent decades.
Yet process innovations in familiar territory aren’t enough 
for the long term. That is because innovation is currently 
happening in new fields. And Germany has long since re-
linquished its lead in the development of semiconductors, 
the computer industry, 3D printing and the Internet of 
Things, nanotechnology, robotics and artificial intelli-
gence – precisely those highly innovative fields that are 
the key disruptive drivers of the fourth Industrial Revolu-
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tion. These fields are also giving rise to developments 
that will have a significant impact on the global economy 
as a whole, and also on the business models of the pro-
ductive industries. Venture capital investments in Germa-
ny fall far behind those of the United States, or even  
China.
One example suffices to illustrate the potential danger – 
the entire auto industry could be reduced to the status of 
supply industry to global data-driven companies in the 
data-driven development of driverless vehicles. According 
to an OECD study, overall value creation is increasingly 
shifting to non-material, particularly data-oriented pro-
cesses (OECD 2017d). Here German companies are lagging 
behind competitors from the United States, Japan, South 
Korea and, increasingly, China (Naudé and Nagler 2017).
Germany must increase its productivity through innova-
tion. This means that its innovation efforts must change 
course. In the era of industrialization, Germany was a 
model for the highly effective cooperation of industry, 
government and university research, and the German 
edu cation model has long been a world leader. But today 
the refusal to relinquish tradition is hampering Germany 
in many fields. The speed of transformation today must 
lead to a rethink of interfaces. What conditions do school, 
vocational and university education have to fulfill and 
what degree of flexibility must systems have to enable 
lifelong learning and capacity for innovation – not just in 
people, but also in companies and authorities?
How must interfaces between university and private research 
be configured to keep pace with global developments? 
What role does the state have in this period of upheaval? 
All of these questions must be on the table in the new of-
fensive for Germany as a land of innovation. Germany’s 
present problems do not stem from an excess in the num-
ber and pace of technical innovations, but rather the con-
trary. Experience shows that as long as Germany drives 
innovation, income inequality constantly falls. For nearly 
30 years, this inequality has instead been growing. It is 
time to push for an innovation policy, that is, for new,  
inclusive growth.
Baseline Recommendations
Enable participation through innovationGermany's innovation capacity 
is under pressure
Eﬀects
Innovation capacity strengthens 
inclusive growth
Germany must enable digital participation 
for broad portions of the workforce.
At the same time, inequality has risen, particularly since the 1990s.
Among other signs, this is evident in the fact 
that the patent “success rate” (the ratio of patents granted 
to the total number of applications) has declined – 
even as other countries are becoming more successful.
In addition, labor productivity has stagnated, 
although spending on research and development has increased.
Problem:
Germany is a leader in process innovation, but is increasingly 
falling behind with regard to far-reaching innovations – 
the key drivers of future sustainable growth.
The digital infrastructure must be expanded
in order to close gaps in broadband deployment, 
particularly in rural areas.
Research and development spending 
should be focused more strongly 
on far-reaching technological progress.
Germany needs a strategy for far-reaching innovation, 
more successful patents and more venture 
order to better support new businesses 
and technologies.
Innovation can provide 
for sustainable growth
Sustainable growth can, in turn, lead to more – 
and better “future-proofed” – employment, 
while also increasing productivity.
This leads to more employment in “good” jobs 
with fair wages – a key condition 
for reduced income inequality.
In the education system, a generalist approach 
and lifelong learning must be promoted 
alongside traditional specialization – in this way, 
workers will always be prepared for 
the changing working world.
Strengthen innovation capacity
The federal and state governments must mount 
a concerted campaign promoting Germany 
as a country of innovation.
1970
Productivity growth has 
declined significantly
since the 1970s.
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